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Battle of the Branches: The
Separation of Powers Doctrine in
State Education Funding Suits
JOY CHIA AND SARAH A. SEO*

What is the scope of judicial power to enforce positive rights, such as the
right to education? This Note analyzes litigation outcomes in state education finance lawsuits to examine how state courts exercise their authority
within the limits of the separation of powers doctrine. The Note argues
that practical,non-legal factors play an important role in a judge's decision to grant remedies addressing unconstitutionallegislative inaction to
provide an adequate public education. In conclusion, the Note discusses
the efficacy of education litigation in light of the judicial branch'sjurisdictional limits, as well as the realitiesof state politics.

I. INTRODUCTION
After the U.S. Supreme Court decided in San Antonio v. Rodriguez' that education is not a fundamental right under the U.S.
Constitution, plaintiffs - usually students, parents of students,
or school districts - have turned to state courts to seek equitable
and adequate funding for public education.2 They have initiated
* Joy L. Chia is an associate at Sidley Austin LLP in New York City. Sarah A. Seo
is a Law Clerk to the Honorable Denny Chin, United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, 2007-2008.
1. 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) ("Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded
explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it
is implicitly so protected.").
2. Michael A. Rebell, EducationalAdequacy, Democracy and the Courts, National
Research Council, available at httpJ/www.schoolfunding.info/resourcecenter/research/
adequacychapter.pdf ("The U.S. Supreme Court's 1973 holding in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez that education was not a fundamental interest under the
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lawsuits in forty-five states to challenge methods for allocating
funds for public schools and to demand reforms such as remedial
legislation, institutional change, and increased appropriations.
In each of these cases, state courts have faced the limits of their
power to order the legislative branch to take affirmative steps
toward education reform.
This Note argues that, in addition to theoretical, constitutional-level considerations such as separation of powers, state
judges have also been guided by practical factors when deciding
education funding cases. An examination of the remedies that
state judges have provided demonstrates the significance of subconstitutional, in contrast to constitutional-level, factors in these
cases. Furthermore, examining each state's entire litigation experience from beginning to end reveals what might have triggered a specific judicial order at a particular stage in the litigation, which often spans years, and sometimes decades. Some recurring and salient "triggering factors" include the context of litigation (e.g., is this the first time the plaintiff class brought an
adequacy suit?), the legislature's response to previous judicial
orders (e.g., did the legislature comply with the initial judicial
order or ignore it?), and the political climate within the state
(e.g., have voters recalled legislation enacted in response to a judicial order?).
After a discussion of the doctrine of separation of powers at
the state level in Part II, Part III examines the various types of
judicial actions in funding suits: finding a non-justiciable question, showing deference, offering guidance, engaging in dialogue,
applying pressure, and employing judicial activism. Another possible litigation outcome, which does not involve extensive judicial
participation, is a settlement agreement between the parties.
Even though a settlement does not require extensive judicial participation, it can arise in response to commencement of an action
or a preliminary court order. This Note uses the above seven
categories in Part III to glean patterns and triggering factors that
indicate what action judges are likely to take at different stages
in litigation.

federal constitution has led to an unprecedented era of constitutional activity by the state
courts in rectifying inequities in state education finance systems.").
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By laying out the range of judicial action that sister state
courts have found to be within the theoretical limits of their powers, this analysis may be helpful not only to parties, but also to
state courts that are still in the middle of protracted litigation.
Even though each state is free to determine its own structure of a
"republican form of government," 3 states frequently borrow novel
legal and policy ideas from the federal and other state governments. Indeed, in some education funding cases, state courts
have relied on case law from other state jurisdictions. For example, a Massachusetts state court adopted guidelines set by the
Kentucky Supreme Court to define the minimum standard of
education that the State of Massachusetts must provide.4
Drawing patterns from the litigation experiences of the fortyfive states that have encountered education funding lawsuits is
thus useful for assessing what the actual limits ofjudicial authority might be in practice, and not just in theory. Furthermore, by
examining the scope of remedies that state courts have afforded
within the bounds of separation of powers, this Note analyzes the
factors that may affect the efficacy of judicial orders to remedy
unconstitutional legislative inaction, as well as the usefulness of
litigation as a tool for education reform. This Note concludes by
suggesting that the effectiveness of litigation depends not only on
the limits set by the doctrine of separation of powers, but also on
the particular political context of education reform in each state.

II. STATE SEPARATION OF POWERS
The controversy over education funding litigation centers on
the authority of courts to grant remedies that, in effect, serve to
make law or policy decisions.5 Underlying this debate is the assumption that a clear boundary exists between legislative and
3. U.S. CONST. art IV, § 4.
4. McDuffy v. Sec'y. of Exec. Off. of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 554-55 (Mass. 1993):
The guidelines set forth by the Supreme Court of Kentucky fairly reflect our
view of the matter and are consistent with the judicial pronouncements found in
other decisions.... These guidelines accord with our Constitution's emphasis on
educating our children to become free citizens on whom the Commonwealth may
rely to meet its needs and to further its interests.
5. Robert A. Schapiro, The Legislative Injunction: A Remedy for Unconstitutional
Legislative Inaction, 99 YALE L.J. 231, 233 (1989) (defining the judicial remedy of a legislative injunction common in education funding suits as one that "create[s] legislation
without any intervening legislative discretion").

Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems

[41:125

judicial duties. Since San Antonio v. Rodriguez, all funding suits
have been brought at the state level where separation of powers
concerns are different from those at the federal level. This raises
two questions: what may state courts do according to state separation of powers limits and - more practically - what do they
actually do?
The separation of powers doctrine is different at the state level
than at the federal level in two important ways. First, the "case
or controversy" requirement of Article III of the U.S. Constitution
binds only federal courts. As a result, unless there are similar
provisions in state constitutions, state courts are not obligated to
abide by the various justiciability and standing doctrines used by
federal courts to ensure that the judiciary does not encroach on
the domains of the legislative and executive branches of the government.6 Although no external federal limits impose judicial
self-restraint on state courts, all states have structured their governments in accordance with the principle of separation of powers, 7 and most state courts often look to federal justiciability principles to decide whether they should resolve a particular case.
Second, many state courts exercise greater jurisdictional authority than federal courts. One reason for this difference is that
some state constitutions authorize their judiciaries to give advisory opinions,8 whereas the prohibition on advisory opinions that
6. Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive Virtues": Rethinking the Judicial
Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1836 (2001) (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750
(1984)).
7. Setting aside the question of whether the imposition of a federal constitutional
doctrine on the states is theoretically desirable, separation of powers is still relevant at
the state level. For one thing, "it is something of an overstatement," as Professor Michael
Doff notes, "to say that the principle of separation of powers has no application to the
states." Michael C. Dorf, The Relevance of Federal Norms for State Separation of Powers,
4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 51, 54 (1999). Dorf argues that although the U.S. Supreme
Court has proclaimed that the federal separation of powers doctrine is not applicable to
the states, it may nonetheless be a structural requirement of the federal Constitution,
which assumes that state governments will have distinct legislative, executive, and judicial branches. Id. at 55. But even without the imposition of the federal principle, states
have retained governmental structures with separation of powers, albeit in different
forms.
8. According to Hershkoff,
[Slome state courts play an explicit and accepted advisory role in their relations
with the other branches. State constitutions in Colorado, Florida, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and South Dakota authorize the judiciary to give advice when the legislature or governor so requests. In
Alabama, Delaware, and Oklahoma, the advisory function is statutorily as-
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constrains federal judges is a long-established constitutional doctrine.9 The federal bar on advisory opinions stems from the idea
that Article III's "case or controversy" requirement necessitates a
court decision that will end an actual dispute. Several states,
however, have dispensed with the need for this separation of
powers mechanism, which scholars such as Professor Helen
Hershkoff have found unsuited to the "easily amended and frequently experimental in approach" of state constitutional decisions. °
Another important distinction between state and federal constitutions - which also explains the different jurisdictional powers of state and federal courts - is that state constitutions often
include social and economic provisions, such as the right to public
education." These positive rights are not found in the federal
Constitution, which generally protects individuals from government overreaching, rather than obliging the government to provide certain rights or privileges. The negative and positive conceptions of individual rights correspond with the different functions that courts may be asked to perform. The role of judicial
review to protect individual liberty from unconstitutional government action is a long-standing bulwark in American jurisprudence. 2 The protection of positive individual rights enumerated
in state constitutions, however, requires state courts "explicitly
[to] engage . . . in substantive areas that have historically been

outside the Article III domain."13 To protect these rights from
unconstitutional government inaction, state courts have sometimes resorted to legislative injunctions, which are court orders
that direct the legislative and executive branches to perform specific duties or adopt certain policies. 4
signed; in a few other states, courts once treated advice as a matter of inherent
power, without constitutional or statutory authorization.
Hershkoff, supra note 6, at 1845-46 (internal citations omitted).
9. Patrick C. McKeever & Billy Dwight Perry, Note, The Case for an Advisory Function in the Federal Judiciary, 50 GEO. L.J. 785, 803 (1962) (noting the bar on advisory
opinions as "a tradition so firmly engrained in our [federal] constitutional law that the
[Supreme] Court has never questioned and seldom bothered to discuss it in any detail.").
10. Hershkoff, supra note 6, at 1852.
11. See, e.g., id. at 1855 ("state constitutions include many substantive social and
economic provisions").
12. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
13. Hershkoff, supra note 6, at 1890.
14. Shapiro, supra note 5, at 233.
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In light of these key differences, state courts have generally
exercised greater jurisdiction in education funding suits compared to federal courts. Some state courts have used advisory
opinions, which violate federal principles of separation of powers. 15 Many state courts have also used legislative injunctions,
which have been criticized as counter-majoritarian because they
empower judges to override the democratically expressed will of
citizens and their representatives.'"
Education funding suits
have thus raised constitutional issues concerning the limits of the
judiciary's authority to provide relief when state education funding falls short of what judges deem constitutionally adequate.
Although many state constitutions allow their courts to venture further into the legislative and executive realms than the
federal Constitution, education funding suits have nevertheless
raised concerns about the appropriate limits of judicial action.
Moreover, state courts have explicitly confronted this issue in
education funding decisions. Several state courts have tried to
reconcile theory with practice, even though the separation of
powers doctrine is less restrictive at the state level. Their approach to justiciability issues in education funding suits thus
provides examples of the various ways they have worked out the
separation of powers doctrine in practice.
III. JUDICIAL REMEDIES AND LITIGATION OUTCOMES
In response to unconstitutional legislative inaction, judges
have provided remedies that fall under several different categories, which are listed in Table 1. The table catalogues the possible litigation outcomes in education financing lawsuits. While
judicial remedies often do not fall neatly into one category, the
following categorization is simply an analytical tool with which to
analyze a court's decision.

15. See supra note 8.
16. Schapiro, supra note 5, at 233 (describing cases in which a court "either order[s]
legislators to enact certain bills or... circumvent[s] the legislative process and create[s]
legislation by judicial decree. Both of these options entail a court's apparent abrogation of
traditionally legislative authority; both substitute the judge's decision as to the positive
content of the law for that of the legislature.").
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Table 1: Types of Judicial Remedies Courts Have Used in Education Lawsuits

Categories of
Litigation Outcomes
1. Settlement
2. Non-Justiciable
Question
3. Deference
4. Guidance
5. Pressuring
6. Dialogue
7. Judicial Activism

States
California, Colorado, Minnesota, Iowa,
Indiana, North Dakota
Alabama, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana,
Maine, Michigan, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Wisconsin
Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, South Carolina,
Vermont, Washington
Arizona, Connecticut, Massachusetts
Kansas
Idaho, Texas, Tennessee,
Maryland, New Jersey,
North Carolina, Wyoming
A. SETTLEMENT

The first two categories, non-justiciability and settlements, are
not judicial remedies; nevertheless, courts are integral actors in
the realization of these outcomes. The initiation of a lawsuit, the
pre-trial actions of a court, and the information made available
through discovery often encourage settlements. For instance, in
1999, a class action suit, Williams v. California,was filed on behalf of students attending substandard public schools in California. 17 After plaintiffs released their expert reports in 2002, but
before trial, the parties announced a settlement. Shortly thereafter in September 2004, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed
five bills implementing the legislative proposals in the settlement
agreement."8 This is one example of how the commencement of
litigation can spur political action.

17. Complaint at 19-22, Williams v. California, No. 312236 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 14,
2000), http'/www.publicadvocates.org/docs/complaint.pdf.
18. ACCESS, EducationAdvocates Across CaliforniaJoin Forces to Win Real Change,
Mar. 24, 2005, available at http:J/www.accessednetwork.orgnews/advocacy/3-2405californiasummit.php3.
For
highlights
of
the
settlement,
see
httpJ/www.publicadvocates.orgdocs/williams _settlementhighlights.htm.
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B. NON-JUSTICIABLE QUESTION

Even if a court believes that state funding for public education
is insufficient, it may nevertheless find that a claim for adequate
funding is non-justiciable for constitutional or prudential reasons,
such as separation of powers or the political question doctrine,
and deny relief. In other words, rather than resolve the problem
of inadequate funding with a judicial remedy, a court may decline
to participate in funding disputes, thereby leaving the matter in
the hands of the political branches of the government. For example, in 1998, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court dismissed
both equity and adequacy suits after deciding that the cases at
hand posed non-justiciable questions.1 9 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the decisions the following year, thereby
ending litigation in that state.2 °
C. DEFERENCE

The deference approach involves a court issuing a declaratory
judgment finding existing state funding statutes unconstitutional, but deferring to the political branches to remedy the situation. For example, while the Arizona Supreme Court did provide
declaratory relief by holding that the state's education funding
statute was unconstitutional in Roosevelt Elementary School District No. 66 v. Bishop,2 ' the court declined to grant other remedies, stating only that "injunctive relief is inappropriate at this
time. 2 In response to the declaratory judgment, the Arizona
legislature created a State Board for School Capital Facilities to
administer a new funding system.2 3

19. Marrero v. Commonwealth, 709 A.2d 956, 965-66 (Pa. 1998) (stating that "[these
are matters which are exclusively within the purview of the General Assembly's powers,
and they are not subject to intervention by the judicial branch of our government.").
20. Pa. Ass'n. of Rural & Small Schs. v. Ridge, 737 A.2d 24, 26 (Pa. 1999) (affg the
order of the Commonwealth Court in Marrero v. Commonwealth, 709 A.2d 956).
21. 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994).
22. Id. at 816.
23. Hull v. Albrecht, 950 P.2d 1141, 1144 (Ariz. 1997) (referring to the legislative
actions changing the disbursement of funds through the State Board for School Capital
Facilities after amendments to ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-1054 (1996)).
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D. GUIDANCE
The guidance model is a slightly more aggressive approach
than the deferential model. A court may suggest guidelines and
standards indicating the constitutional minimum for adequate
education, but refrain from articulating the specific actions required for a funding statute to meet that minimum standard.
Education funding litigation in West Virginia is illustrative. After the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that education was a fundamental right in Pauley v. Kelly,2 4 a circuit
court, the state's court of general jurisdiction, found "constitutional infirmities in the structure and composition" of the education finance system." As a remedy, the court "directed the formulation of a Master Plan for Public Education" ("Master Plan"),
which established a "constitutionally acceptable baseline to guide
the Legislative and Executive Branches in the delivery of a thorough and efficient system of free schools."26 The Master Plan is
now the constitutional model for public education funding in
West Virginia.2 7

E. DIALOGUE
The legislative and judicial branches may engage in dialogue,
in which the legislature enacts or amends laws pursuant to a
court order, followed by the court's reassessment of the improved
law and orders for additional changes as necessary. This back
and forth between the branches usually continues through several iterations, until the court finally determines that the state
has met its constitutional standard. Education litigation in
Texas followed this model of judicial action.
24. 255 S.E.2d 859 (W.Va. 1979).
25. Tomblin v. Gainer, No. CIV.A. 75-1268 (Cir. Ct. W. Va. Jan. 3, 2003), available at
httpJ/www.schoolfunding.info/states/wv/lit-wv.php3.
26. Id. at 3.
27. West Virginia's courts considered a constitutional challenge to the state's education funding system in 2000. The trial judge referred to the Master Plan in finding the
state's Public School Support Plan unconstitutional. See Tomblin v. Gainer, Civil Action
No. 75-1268 (Cir. Ct. W. Va. 2000) available at httpJ/www.schoolfunding.info/stateswv/
litwv.php3. The legislature responded within a year of the decision and enacted W.V.A.
Code § 18-2E-5, which was found constitutional. Tomblin v. State Board of Education,
Civil
Action
No.
75-1268
(Cir.
Cy.
W.
Va.
2003),
available at
http'//www.schoolfunding.info/states/wv/lit-wv.php3.
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After determining the school financing system to be unconstitutional, the Texas Supreme Court gave the political branches
one year to enact remedial legislation, after which the court
warned that it would enjoin state officials from enforcing the
state's education funding statutes. 2' Although the legislature did
enact new funding legislation, the court found it inadequate. 29 As
a result, the supreme court reinstated the first injunction, but
granted another temporary stay to give the legislature a second
chance to comply with its order. This process took three cycles,
resulting in three different legislative amendments." The supreme court finally accepted the third legislative amendment as
constitutional.3 1
Presumably because the legislature demonstrated good faith in its efforts to comply with the court's decrees,
it never issued its injunctive order.
F.

PRESSURING

When litigation has progressed for some time - usually after
the plaintiff class has brought repeated suits to enforce previous
judicial orders - courts may be willing to apply some pressure on
the legislative branch. They may attempt to spur compliance by
foreshadowing or threatening what actions they will take should
the political branches fail to provide constitutionally adequate
funding. Typically, courts set deadlines accompanied by suggestions of more aggressive measures. The interaction between
Kansas State's supreme court and legislature is illustrative.
After declaring the state school-funding scheme unconstitutional in 2003, a Kansas district court withheld final judgment
for one year to give the legislature time to craft remedial legislation.32 In response to the state legislature's failure to change
school funding laws during the one-year grace period, the district
court issued a new ruling in 2004, giving the legislature two
months to comply with the order, after which the court would de-

28. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood ), 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
29. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby (Edgewood I/), 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1991).
30. Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist.
(Edgewood111), 826 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. 1992).
31. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno (Edgewood IV), 893 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. 1995).
32. Montoy v. State, No. 99-C-1738, 2003 WL 22902963, at *50 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Dec. 2,
2003) (mem.).
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clare the existing educational funding statutes void and close all
public schools.33 On the state's appeal, the Kansas Supreme
Court stayed the lower court's order to give the state one month
to implement a minimum $285 million increase in funding and
suggested that it "will consider, among other remedies, ordering.

. . $568 million in increased funding."34 In its 2006 session, the

legislature responded by increasing annual state funding by another $466 million.35 The Kansas Supreme Court then held that
the new system complied with its earlier decisions and closed the
case in July 2006.36
G. JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
Courts may require the political branches to enact specific legislation to meet constitutional requirements. This form of judicial remedy, which has policy-making aspects, is most assertive.
New Jersey's history of protracted education litigation - which
began in 1973 when the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the
public school funding system violated the state's constitution37 has resulted in this model of judicial action. The state legislature
has since attempted multiple funding schemes, but New Jersey
courts have found them all unconstitutional (Abbotts I-X). By
Abbott IV, the supreme court began specifying what the legislature would have to provide in order to meet the state's constitutional requirement of a "thorough and efficient" education system.3" In Abbott IV, for example, the supreme court ordered the
state to implement full-day pre-kindergarten programs, summer
school, whole school reform, and school-based health and social
services. 9 By Abbott VIII in 2002, the supreme court also began
33. Montoy v. State, No. 99-C-1738, 2004 WL 1094555, at *15 (Kan. Dist. Ct. May 11,
2004).
34. Montoyv. State, 112 P.3d 923, 941 (Kan. 2005) (emphasis added).
35. Access, Quality Education, Kansas Litigation, httpJ/www.schoolfunding.info/
states/ks/lit-ks.php3.
36. Montoy v. State, 138 P.3d 755, 765-66 (Kan. 2006).
37. Robinson v. Cahill, 287A.2d 187, 217 (N.J. 1972). Although the New Jersey Supreme Court decided in Abbott v. Burke (Abbott I), 495 A.2d 376 (N.J. 1985) that education
litigation should appear before the Department of Education rather than the courts, plaintiffs appeal of an administrative agency's decision marked the return of litigation to New
Jersey courts. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott I), 575 A.2d at 365 (N.J. 1990).
38. N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, para. 1.
39. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott V), 693 A.2d 417 (N.J. 1997).
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to oversee the state's education budget.4" Litigation continues to
date, with the New Jersey Supreme Court still heavily involved
in overseeing the administration of the state's public school system.
IV. SUB-CONSTITUTIONAL FACTORS
The case studies in Part III show that the scope of judicial
power is not as distinct as the theory of separation of powers in
its demarcation of the roles of the three branches of government.
This part examines the extra-legal or sub-constitutional factors
that may affect a court's response to unconstitutional legislative
inaction.
A. POLITICIANS AND POLITICS
Individual actors and political personalities not only affect the
tenor of a dispute over education funding, but can also color a
judge's perspective of the political will to act. New York State's
"three men in a room" 41 policy-making model is illustrative of the
influence of a few government officials who determine the allocation of education funding for an entire state. The New York legislature uses approximately fifty different formulas - formulas
that state education commissioner Richard P. Mills admits he
does not fully understand42 - to distribute $12.5 billion among
the state's public schools.4 3 Yet New York State Supreme Court
Justice Leland DeGrasse, who presided over the State's education
funding suit, Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State of New

40. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott WII), 790 A.2d 842 (N.J. 2002).
41. Anemona Hartocollis, To Judge, School-Aid Formula Is Easy: '3 Men in a Room',
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2001, at B6. The three men Judge DeGrasse refers to are the Governor, the Assembly Speaker and the Senate Majority Leader. See also Steven R. Weisman,
Machiavelli and New York's School-Aid Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2001, at A22 (describing how the wishes of "the most powerful lawmakers" are "carried out through seemingly neutral formulas devised behind closed doors by staff experts who talk to each other
in lingo like RWADA (resident weighted average daily attendance) and TWPU (total
weighted pupil units)").
42. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc., IN EVIDENCE: POLICY REPORTS FROM THE CFE
TRIAL, REFORMING NEW YORK STATE'S FLAWED SCHOOL FINANCE SYSTEM, at 5, available

at http'J/www.cfequity.org/funding.pdf.
43. Id. at 4.
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York ("CFE")," found that none of the complex formulas mattered
very much because three men - the Governor, the Assembly
Speaker, and the Senate Majority Leader - ultimately determined the final allocation.4 5 He found the formulas "unnecessarily complex and opaque," and ultimately pointless in light of the
way funding decisions were actually made.46
When a few individuals control the distribution of state funds
for a politicized issue such as education funding, conflicting political agendas and the maneuverings for public approval are
some of the factors that heighten stakes and contribute to impasse, which may indirectly affect the outcome of litigation.4 7 In
New York, for instance, former Governor George E. Pataki publicly confronted the CFE lawsuit in which he and his administration were named defendants. Before Justice DeGrasse issued his
decision in 2001, Governor Pataki preempted a likely ruling favorable to the plaintiffs by calling the school financing system a
"dinosaur"4" that belongs on the "ash heap of history"4 9 to suggest
that, even though he was being sued for not providing adequate
funding to New York City schools, he supported funding reform.
Yet, when the expected decision ordering the state to increase
spending on New York City schools came down, Governor Pataki
annovnced that he planned to appeal the decision, thereby postponing the reform of education funding in New York State. The
appeal delayed resolution of the case until after the 2002 election
when Governor Pataki would face reelection, thus giving him a

44. 719 N.Y.S.2d 475 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001), rev'd, 744 N.Y.S.2d 130 (N.Y. App. Div.
2002).
45. Hartocollis, supra note 41, at B6.
46. Id.
47. See generally Brief for the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University
School of Law as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants-Respondents, Campaign for Fiscal
Equity et al. v. State, 8 N.Y.3d 14, 26-27 (N.Y. 2006) (No. 111070/93), available at
http://www.brennancenter.org/dynamic/subpagealdownload file_38902.pdf. The Brennan
Center argues that the "unique structural flaws in the legislative and budgeting process of
New York State" have contributed heavily to state inaction. Id. at 1. These include severe
legislative dysfunction, a paucity of true conference committees in Albany, and open defiance by the State. Id. at 4, 12, & 14-15.
48. Joyce Purnick, Metro Matters: Indictment of Politics of Education, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 15, 2001, at B1.
49. Michael A. Rebell, Stuck in the Stone Age, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2005, at 14LI.
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chance "to reverse some or all of a ruling that amount[ed] to political dynamite." 0
Standoffs can also arise when prominent and well-supported
political players, such as Governor Pataki and former New York
City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, have competing legislative and
budgetary proposals. This is one reason why attempts at compliance with court orders may fail to garner sufficient support. The
Governor's 2004 proposal for the education budget, for example,
was countered by the state assembly's own proposal, and even an
extraordinary legislative session did not produce any progress in
achieving compliance with CFE directives. 5 ' When the process
for effecting social change becomes mired in political battles and
results in stalemate, a trial court may find it necessary to take
aggressive remedial action, as exemplified by Justice DeGrasse's
order that New York State provide New York City's schools $5.63
billion for operating expenses and $9.2 billion for facilities.5 2
B.

JUDGES

In addition to officials in the legislative and executive
branches, individual judges may be influenced by their own political or personal views, which may, in turn, influence the outcome of education finance litigation. Studies have connected
judges' political partisanship to the varying outcomes in adequacy
cases in different states,53 but three other factors also affect judicial behavior: a judge's judicial philosophy, the selection process
and tenure of state judges, and a judge's perception of institutional constraints.
A case study from Alabama demonstrates the significance of
individual judges' views on judicial restraint and separation of
powers in adequacy suits. Although Alabama courts had exercised jurisdiction over education funding suits throughout the
50. Richard Perez-Pena & Abby Goodnough, Pataki to Appeal Decision by Judge on
Aid to Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2001, at B6.
51. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 814 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006).
52. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 8 N.Y.3d 14, 26-27 (N.Y. 2006).
53. Several studies about the politics of education finance litigation have focused on
the political, professional, and personal backgrounds of individual judges and the possible
influence these factors have on judges' decision-making. See, e.g., William S. Koski, The
Politics of Judicial Decision-Making in Educational Policy Reform Litigation, 55
HASTINGS L.J. 1077, 1088-1104 (2004).
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1990s, the Supreme Court of Alabama unexpectedly moved to
reexamine all of its previous education funding decisions when a
2001 case concerning taxation and public education raised separation of powers issues.' The Alabama Supreme Court, seeking
to revisit the separation of powers issue, then vacated its own
1997 order finding subject matter jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of the state's education system. In 2002, the state
supreme court ultimately concluded that Alabama courts did not
have the authority to review education funding issues because
the subject was non-justiciable. It dismissed the case and deferred matters concerning education reform to the state legislature.55
The supreme court left unexplained the change from its 1997
position on separation of powers, when it found subject matter
jurisdiction, to its 2002 decision finding education funding nonjusticiable. One possible explanation is the change in the supreme court's composition between 1997 and 2002. Out of nine
members, only one member of the 1997 court, Justice J. Gorman
Houston, was still sitting in 2002.56 And Justice Houston had
dissented from the majority on the justiciability issue in the 1997
decision."
54. Siegelman v. Ala. Ass'n of Sch. Bds., 819 So.2d 568 (Ala. 2001). In 1993, the
Montgomery County Circuit Court found Alabama's educational system unconstitutional
because it failed to provide equitable and adequate educational opportunities. See Ala.
Coal. for Equity, Inc. v. Hunt, No. 90-883, 91-0117, 1993 WL 204083, at *1 (Ala. Cir. Ct.
Apr. 1, 1993). Subsequent challenges to the justiciability of education funding reached the
Alabama Supreme Court in 1997, which held that it had subject matter jurisdiction to
consider the constitutionality of the State's education system. Ex parte James, 713 So.2d
869, 879 (Ala. 1997), overruled by Ex parte James, 836 So.2d 813 (Ala. 2002) (specifically
citing similar decisions by California, Georgia, Kentucky, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming).
55. Exparte James, 836 So.2d 813 (Ala. 2002).
56. Information
about
the
court
composition
can
be
found
at
httpJ/www.judicial.state.al.ussupreme.cfm.
57. Writing in his dissent, Justice Houston stated:
Circumstances have denied this Court the opportunity to review the trial court's
liability order. Even so, it is the duty of the Judicial Department of Alabama
government only to determine what the Constitution of Alabama requires. In
my opinion, the Legislative Department and the Executive Department, and not
the Judicial Department, have the power and duty to implement a plan that
would make this system equitable ... The "Separation of Powers" provision of
the Constitution of Alabama of 1901 (Art. III, § 43) prohibits me from doing
more, without resorting to unconstitutional judicial activism, which I have heretofore avoided.
Ex ParteJames, 713 So.2d 869, 895 (Ala. 1997).
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Furthermore, state judges are not immune to political pressures, which also affect litigation outcomes. Many state judicial
positions are filled by election rather than by appointment. The
prospect of facing reelection can leave a judge vulnerable to popular sentiment on certain key issues. Moreover, even if a state
judge is appointed, many states limit judicial appointments to a
specified term. When a judge must face reappointment, the judicial branch may be predisposed to defer to the political branches
of the government. Judges in Ohio, for example, are chosen in
partisan primaries and rely on political leaders for fundraising
support, which limit their judicial independence, particularly in
costly and politically controversial issues such as education reform.5" From 1991 to 2002, the Ohio Supreme Court found the
state's education finance system unconstitutional three times
(DeRolphs I-III), and each time, it directed the state legislature
to remedy the deficiencies.5 9 In 2003, after the legislature rejected the Governor's proposed tax increase to finance public education, plaintiffs asked an Ohio superior court for a compliance
conference. In response, the state asked the Ohio Supreme Court
to prohibit such action, and the court, which had changed composition after the latest judicial election, issued a writ of prohibition
forbidding the superior court from exercising jurisdiction, thus
ending finance litigation in Ohio.6" The chain of events in Ohio
demonstrates the perceptible pressures that elected judges must
confront.
In addition to the political pressures on elected or fixed-term
judges, the likelihood of a power struggle between the judicial
and political branches of the government may also influence
judges. State judges are aware of the institutional constraints on
the judiciary and decide politically controversial issues, such as
education reform, within these constraints. The uncertainty of
the judiciary's role and authority in social reform implicates
questions of institutional legitimacy, and judges may risk undermining their power should the political branches ignore a court
order. A court's perception of its authority relative to the political
58. Koski, supra note 54, at 1149.
59. DeRolph v. State (DeRolph 1), 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997); DeRolph II, 728
N.E.2d 993 (Ohio 2000); DeRolph III, 754 N.E.2d 1184 (Ohio 2001), overruled by State ex
rel. State v. Lewis, 789 N.E. 2d 195 (Ohio 2003).
60. State ex rel. State v. Lewis, 789 N.E.2d 195 (Ohio 2003).
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branches, therefore, may affect how assertive a court may be. In
the end, the possibility of institutional conflict may persuade
judges to remove themselves from the policy-making field on the
ground of non-justiciability. Alternatively, a court may decide to
confront the legislature, as the New Jersey Supreme Court did in
1976, when it shut down public schools for eight days because the
state legislature refused to raise taxes to increase funding for
public schools.6 1
Between these two extremes of withdrawal and combat is an
intermediate approach, which courts are likely to take when the
state legislature appears cooperative or when there is a mutual
respect among branches of the government. This approach allows
dialogue between the judicial and legislative branches, which is
what occurred in Texas.62 There, the Texas Supreme Court continued to provide temporary stays to give the legislature time to
enact remedial legislation. The court reviewed each legislative
amendment and allowed the legislature to try again each time it
found the amendments unconstitutional. This mutually deferential relationship developed in part because of the legislature's
good faith efforts to comply with court orders each time the supreme court found a newly enacted funding statute inadequate.
C.

CONTEXT OF LITIGATION

The remedy a court provides in funding suits is, for the most
part, discretionary. A court may grant only a declaratory judgment finding the state's funding system unconstitutional. It may
set a deadline for the state legislature to fix the system. It may
also specify the particular actions the legislature must take to
meet the minimum constitutional standard. Given the range of
possible solutions, how a court determines its remedy often depends on the context of the litigation.
If a court is issuing its first decision in the case, it may be
more inclined to give the legislative branch the first opportunity
to resolve the situation without interference from the judicial
branch. In subsequent rulings, however, a court may tailor its
61. Robinson v. Cahill, 358 A.2d 457 (N.J. 1976). As a result, the legislature enacted
New Jersey's first state income tax. Education Law Center, http'/lwww.edlawcenter.org(
ELCPublic/AbbottvBurkelAbbottHistory.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2008).
62. See supra Part III.E.

Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems

[41:125

orders more aggressively depending on the state's previous responses.63
After a judicial finding that funding is inadequate, the legislature can respond in various ways. It can promulgate new laws or
amend existing statutes, or it may appeal to a higher court. Alternatively, the legislature, by succumbing to a lack of political
will, may do nothing at all.' 4 In particularly hostile environments, the political branches may accompany their unresponsiveness with vocal criticism of the courts for engaging in judicial
activism.65
If a state has demonstrated cooperation to meet the constitutional standards set by the court, a court may remain relatively
uninvolved. 66 But if the state appears intractable or has responded uncooperatively in the past, then a court may consider
increasingly aggressive measures. The evolution of the New Jersey Supreme Court's role in the state's funding suit is an example
of how the relationship between the judicial and legislative
branches can impact a court's involvement in education reform.
The New Jersey Supreme Court found the school funding system unconstitutional in Robinson v. Cahill,6 7 and in response, the
state legislature enacted the Public School Education Act of
1975.68 In 1981, plaintiffs filed Abbott v. Burke (Abbott 1) to challenge the application of the 1975 Act,6 9 which the state supreme
court deemed unconstitutional as applied to poorer urban districts in Abbott 1.70 As a result, the legislature enacted the Qual-

63. Education funding suits are often protracted for years. One reason why adequacy
suits continue for many years - and why funding disputes are rarely resolved even after
a court issues a ruling - is that plaintiffs are often unsatisfied with the way the state
responds to a court's decision, and file another suit to enforce a previous order.
64. See, e.g., CFE case described in Part W.A.
65. One example of a hostile reaction is the Kansas legislature's response by questioning the district court's findings of fact and not taking any action to rectify the constitutional violations in the funding statutes. Montoy v. State, No. 99-1738, 2004 WL 1094555,
at *5 (Kan. Dist. Ct. May 11, 2004) (noting that "rather than attack the problem, the legislature chose instead to attack the Court").
66. See the Texas case study in Part III.E.
67. Robinson v. Cahill, 287 A.2d 187, 217 (N.J. 1972).
68. Robinson v. Cahill, 360 A.2d 400 (N.J. 1975).
69. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott 1), 495 A.2d 376 (N.J. 1985).
70. The New Jersey Supreme Court ordered the state legislature to amend the 1975
Act or enact new legislation to ensure substantial equality in funding between "specialneeds districts" and the property-rich districts. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott I), 575 A.2d 359,
385 (N.J. 1990). It also required that the level of funding "be adequate to provide for the
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ity Education Act of 1990 ("QEA"). The supreme court declared
the QEA unconstitutional in Abbott III, however, for failing to
ensure a thorough education: although the QEA authorized
equal spending, it did not guarantee funding sufficient to pay for
the authorized level of spending. 7 '
In its fourth attempt, the legislature passed a new act, the
Comprehensive Educational Improvement and Financing Act
(CEIFA).7 2 The Abbott IV court, however, found CEIFA unconstitutional as applied to the special needs districts, even if it was
facially constitutional, because the statute did not achieve substantial equality in per-pupil expenditures.73
These exchanges between the New Jersey Supreme Court and
legislature continued for a total of ten times over more than
twenty years. Each time, the supreme court ordered more detailed and specific remedies such that the court, in effect, became
a supervisor of the public school system. Its Abbott V decision,
for instance, ordered an unprecedented series of entitlements for
urban school children including: whole school reform; full-day
kindergarten and preschool for all three and four year olds; and a
comprehensive state managed and funded facilities program to
correct code violations, eliminate overcrowding, and provide adequate space for all educational programs.74 The supreme court
also required implementation of other supplemental programs,
such as health and social services; increased security; technology
alternative education; and school-to-work, after-school and summer-school programs.75 As the litigation in New Jersey illustrates, when a state court perceives its legislature to be uncooperative and noncompliant, it may be more inclined to inject itself
in the management of the public school system.

special educational needs of these poorer urban districts" and "address their extreme
disadvantages." Id. at 385.
71. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott III), 643 A.2d 575, 580 (N.J. 1994).
72. The Comprehensive Educational Improvement and Financing Act (CEIFA) set
universal academic standards, identified programs to accomplish these goals, included
supplemental programs to redress the disadvantages of special-needs students, provided a
funding mechanism to ensure their support, and included mechanisms for enforcement.
73. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott V), 693 A.2d 417, 433 (N.J. 1997).
74. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott V), 710 A.2d 450, 512-16 (N.J. 1998).
75. Id. at 512-16.
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V. CONCLUSION: EDUCATION LAWSUITS AND SYSTEMS
REFORM
An underlying question in adequacy suits is whether litigation
is the appropriate mechanism to achieve systemic reform whether courts are an appropriate forum for pursuing legislative
change. Adequacy suits are premised on the assumption that
litigation is a viable tool for education reform, and this is evident
from the widespread use of litigation in pursuit of a cause. In
light of lengthy litigation in states across the country, as well as
the theoretical uncertainty of the courts' authority to issue legislative injunctions, the assumption that litigation is effective is
questionable. From a systems-reform perspective, over-reliance
on litigation might be misplaced, and the lawyer-advocate should
carefully consider whether and when litigation is appropriate.
One issue to consider is the nature of the inequality being
challenged. During the civil rights movement, litigation was an
effective method to challenge formal institutional barriers to
equality. However, more general and systematic inequality that
is rooted in other social problems may be more difficult, or perhaps impossible, to solve with declaratory relief, especially when
courts are not equipped with the power to enforce their mandates. The most glaring example of this is Connecticut's experience with public school desegregation in Sheff v. O'Neill.7" While
early civil rights cases like Brown v. Board of Education7 7 countered segregation by invalidating laws allowing for separate
schools, the segregation experienced by Hartford public school
students in Sheff was a result of white flight to the suburbs and
the gradual impoverishment of the City as it lost most of its industrial base over the twentieth century. The Sheff court's declaratory relief, therefore, was an inadequate solution to the underlying social transformations that resulted in de facto segregation in public schools, such as rising unemployment and ghettoization. Perhaps one lesson of Sheff v. O'Neill is that when facing
multifaceted social problems, it may be better for courts to uphold
a more rigorous separation of powers doctrine and direct reform-

76.
77.

733 A.2d 925 (Conn. 1999).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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ers to pursue social change in the democratically elected branches
of the government.
The mood of the electorate is also an important factor. Judges
are cognizant of the counter-majoritarian aspect of remedies such
as legislative injunctions, and support for reform may encourage
courts to take a stern stance towards uncooperative state governments. On the other hand, the public may take the issue out
of the courts, thereby frustrating litigation efforts. In the California case Serrano v. Priest,7" both the California Supreme Court
and legislature were sympathetic to the plaintiff class and attempted to reform education funding through judicial orders and
legislation. Voter referenda prohibiting increased taxes, however,
thwarted their efforts.79 When voters place other priorities ahead
of the expensive overhaul of the state's education system, litigation may prove futile. In these circumstances, it may be more
effective to utilize time and effort to build consensus and public
support for education reform.
Another consideration is the potential legislative reaction to
education lawsuits and the possible power struggle between the
judicial and legislative branches. As seen from our analysis,
courts can spur legislatures to action. 0 Nonetheless, legislatures,
such as the Kansas and New York legislatures, can sometimes be
reluctant to act even with a judicial order. In these instances, the
lawyer-advocate must consider available non-litigation alterna78. 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976).
79. The California Supreme Court ruled that the State's financing system was invalid
as a violation of equal protection under the California Constitution, and required the State
to eliminate all wealth-related differences in school funding, thereby instituting a new
standard of equality: per pupil expenditures could not vary by more than $100 among all
the school districts in the State. Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 952 (Cal. 1976). In response to legislative changes to correct this constitutional violation, anti-tax voter initiatives (Proposition 13 and 4) were passed, placing strict limits on property taxes and spending. Some scholars have attributed the passage of Proposition 13 directly to the Serrano
rulings, arguing:
By constitutionalizing the inherently political issue of school finance, the
Serrano court left the California legislature with almost no room to respond to
the property tax revolt of the late 1970s. ... Serrano forced a legislature that
was apparently eager to help poorer schools to adopt a particular response that
was so far from California voter's demand for education that they brought
Proposition 13 down on themselves.
William A. Fischel, How Serrano Caused Proposition 13, 12 J.L. & POL. 607, 608-09
(1996).
80. See the California case study, described in Part III.A, where the legislature
quickly responded to adopt the terms of the Williams settlement.

146

Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems

[41:125

tives and compare the relative advantages and disadvantages of
litigation. On the one hand, litigation is a long process and the
scarce resources required to pursue a lawsuit could also be spent
on lobbying, fact-finding reports (e.g., researching education models that work), and grassroots movements for education reform.
On the other hand, litigation may be useful as a vehicle to inform
the public of systemic problems, and it offers an opportunity to
present a narrative of system failure. Litigation can serve as a
measured way to create a cause around which advocates can rally
and, ultimately, achieve change.
A court's decision to provide the remedy of a legislative injunction, or even an advocate's decision to pursue one, requires not
only a constitutional-level inquiry, but also pragmatic, contextspecific considerations. As a result, it is necessary in the course
of systems reform advocacy to consider the political context. The
analysis presented in this Note demonstrates that education litigation can be successful in limited circumstances in light of the
"battle of the branches" that could arise when courts must use
legislative injunctions in the face of unconstitutional legislative
inaction.

